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30 NOVEMBER 1979 NO. 2051

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JPRS 74691 30 November 1979

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2051



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

IRAQI AID TO LEBANON--Beirut, 15 Nov--It was announced here today that Iraq will grant \$5 million in aid to southern Lebanon to bolster the struggle of the southern Lebanese masses in their confrontation of the continued Zionist attacks. It is to be pointed out that this aid is the third of its kind. [Excerpt] [JN151226 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1200 GMT 15 Nov 79 JN]

AFGHANISTAN

'KABUL RADIO' CITES AMIN ON REVOLUTION'S ULTIMATE TRIUMPH

LD172303 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GMT 17 Nov 79 LD

[Text] We present you our commentary under the title of "Antirevolution Elements Are Doomed":

Hafizollah Amin, general secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, while answering the questions of the German Democratic Republic television correspondent in an interview recently said:

Nowadays, not only the elements who are against our revolution are fleeing but their masters and foreign allies are also fleeing. This is because hard blows have been inflicted by the toiling people on these elements. The people have now understood that they are a factor, a main factor, in the process of development of this country. They have realized that they have been the basic and real producers in the land and they have fully realised that the international imperialism and black reaction are the cruellest enemies of mankind who are desperately trying to provide grounds for the exploitation and bloodsucking in the backward and underdeveloped nations.

All these achievements have, of course, been secured in the light of the Khalqi revolution and the lofty guidance of our party, that is the people's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the vanguard of the working class of this land. This is why they are joining hards with their epoch-making party and Khalq Government to eliminate (?cruel hands) and treacherous collusion of the enemies of the revolution, their masters and supporters.

The people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are now fully convinced that no elements whatsoever are of any importance inside the country to combat the power of the people here. Such elements, if existed here, could hardly bear to take any (?fraudulent) measures against our people and Khalqi order. They may, however, carry their malicious activities like (?teeth) against our people, which is done everywhere. They are not that much important. The foreign elements about which the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and other oppressed people of the world are really concerned are the international imperialism, black reaction and

leftist-looking allies of imperialism which are treacherously interfering in our internal affairs and are trying to create tension and prepare grounds for, God forbid, foiling our victorious revolution.

Otherwise, the treacherous Ekhwanis and other enemies of our Khalqi order neither have the power nor the arms and ammunition to use against us. These materials are prepared by the imperialists and their leftist-looking allies. At any rate, if they are connected together and help each other against the oppressed people of the world and against the heroic people of Afghanistan, and they will be soon doomed (?to) complete failure today or tomorrow, because their hostility against human well-being, [words indistinct] actions and their exploitative nature have totally been revealed and realized by all the people of the world.

AFGHANISTAN

#### BRIEFS

PEOPLE RETURN HOME--Those compatriots of ours who have left their homes owing to the treacherous provocations and poisonous propaganda of the enemies of the Sawr revolution and the enemies of our sacred soil, in light of the total amnesty by Comrade Hafizollah Amin, today too, returned in large numbers, happily and shouting revolutionary slogans, to their homes in the Spinbuldak District of the Qandahar Province and the (Tazai) District in the Zabol Province. They were warmly welcomed by the officials and the noble people of that district, [Text] [LD192304 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 19 Nov 79 LD] Some of our compatriots left their homes because of the treacherous provocations and false propaganda of the enemies of the Sawr revolution and the enemies of our sacred soil. Following the total amnesty decreed by Comrade Hafizollah Amin, a large number of them returned happily to their homes in the following areas: the Wardak, District of Seyyedabad, in Kabul Province; Alingar District, in the Laghman Province, and the Zazi District, in Paktia Province. They were warmly welcomed by the district officials, provincial party organizations, members of the committee for the defense of the revolution, and by a large number of the people of these districts. They expressed their revolutionary feelings by pledging support for the government and demonstrating that they are prepared to defend the revolution with sacrifices of any kind. [Text] [LD171836 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 17 Nov 79 LD] Of those of our compatriots who left their homes because of the treacherous provocations and false propaganda of the enemies of the Sawr revolution and the enemies of our sacred soil, in the light of the total amnesty offered by Comrade Hafizollah Amin, a large number returned today, happily and by giving revolutionary slogans, to their homes in: the center of Farah Province, the Keshandoy Subdistrict in Balkh Province and the Kohestanat District of Jowzjan Province, A BAKHTAR correspondent reports from Farah that upon the return of these compatriots to Far. , a meeting was held there where the governor of Farah, some members of the provincial committess; members of the committee for the defense of revolution and a large number of the toiling people of the province welcomed them to their homes. These compatriots in Farah Center and the other two district: in turn expressed their total unity with our Khalqi Government and promised to make any kind of sacrifice. [Text] [LD182215 Kabul Radio in Pashto to Europe 1530 GMT 18 Nov 79 LD]

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PRISONERS RELEASED—In accordance with the slogan immunity, legality and justice, 25 political prisoners of the Farah Province were released from prison, after the investigation of their case by the authoritative commission for the release of prisoners. [Text] [LD192305 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 19 Nov 79 LD]

GDR ENVOY--His Excellency, (Klaus Sandel), ambassador designate of the German Democratic Republic to Afghanistan, arrived in Kabul today. He was received at Kabul airport by the chief of protocol department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and charge d'affaires of the German Democratic Republic Embassy in Kabul. [Text] [LD180702 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GMT 17 Nov 79 LD]

IRAN

ARMY BEGINS HUNT FOR FOREIGN AGENTS IN KORDESTAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Oct 79 p 9

[Text] In order to separate the counterrevolutionaries from the innocent people in Kordestan and to totally cleanse the region of counterrevolutionaries, psychological units of the territorial forces have been sent into Kordestan with broad powers, and have begun their work.

Gen Valiollah Falahi, commander of the territorial forces, who is currently in the hospital, told a KEYHAN reporter this morning that "since the counter-revolutionaries have not yet been separated from the defenseless, innocent and loyal people, and the army is progressing slowly in cleansing the region, we are sending psychological units into Kordestan to learn the people's needs and to separate them from counterrevolutionary agents and members of the proscribed Democratic Party, so that we can proceed quickly with purification of the region. Following their activities, the army yesterday began a major campaign to purify the region. As the army gains experience, its casualties decline; in the last 2 days we have lost only one killed and two wounded."

The general added: "Following these steps the enemy has gone on the defensive, avoiding engagements with our forces and seeking refuge. In two operations, we captured a large quantity of rebel arms and munitions in the Zamziram Pass."

According to the general, "in areas where steps have not yet been taken to separate the counterrevolutionaries, the army has been unable to act."

Concerning the gunfire which goes on at some times of the day and night in various areas, he said that "this is natural in combat zones. As you know, all sensitive areas, garrisons in particular, are under guard by soldiers and other armed personnel. These guards shoot as soon they see a shadow nearby. Hearing shots, the other guards also put their finger to the trigger. After the firing dies down, it turns out that it was only a tree branch shaking. The same sort of thing happens on the counterrevolutionary side."

The general concluded by saying that "the government is ready to implement social and economic measures in Kordestan, as well as continuing political discussions, which hopefully will lead to the desired result."

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IRAN

# OFFICIALS DESCRIBE CRITICAL SITUATION IN KORDESTAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Oct 79 p 3

[Text] Orumiyeh and Sanandaj--Yesterday the political deputy to the governor general of Western Azarbaijan announced: "The recent involvements in Mahabad are in no way to the benefit of the region especially the city of Mahabad and it will only be to the interest of the colonialists. Whereas we want to maintain our independence and cut off the hands of colonialism from our country."

In an interview with PARS, Dr Atabak, political deputy to the governor general of Western Azarbaijan talked about the causes of involvement in the city of Mahabad and its current condition. He said: "Based on the report I received, two personnel carriers belonging to the army were taking lunch for the Pasdaran [guards] when they were attacked by antitank guns and four of them were injured. The military returned the fire and three of the attackers were killed."

Dr Atabak added: "Of course, there was some shooting from the roofs of houses which continued until yesterday morning. Yesterday morning we heard that no one was seen in the streets of Mahabad and that everything was closed in the city."

About controlling the city of Mahabad, the deputy governor general said: "The city is surrounded by security forces and the general control of the city is in the hands of the army."

He expressed his hope that the Mahabad problem would be solved as soon as possible. He asked all of the Moslem fellow-citizens in Mahabad not to give shelter to the bunch of irresponsible and adventurous persons who had penetrated into the city.

The deputy governor general added: "This fighting is not to the benefit of the region, especially the city of Mahabad. It will only be to the benefit of the colonialists. Whereas we want to maintain our independence and cut off the hands of colonialism from our country."

On the other hand, the PARS correspondent talked with Amir Mosseyn Shajari and Abbas Imampur, two of the injured guards who had been transferred from Mahabad to Orumiyeh. Amir Mosseyn Shajari told our reporter in the hospital: "With a group of guards, we were taking lunch for other guards in two personnel carriers the day before yesterday at noon, when we were attacked. At first one of the personnel carriers was demolished and six of the nine passengers were injured. One of the Pasdar was killed. His name was Hosseyn Jamal Kashani."

Amir Husayn Shajari added: "I was on the second personnel carrier and I was the only person who was injured. All of the injured were transferred to Orumiyeh and are under treatment. The rest are O.K."

Fighting on Hills

Another of the injured men said: "Eighteen of our military brothers were also injured and two tanks sustained heavy damages". Imampur, a guard, added: "Last night on one of the hills overlooking the city, three soldiers were also attacked and injured by attackers."

This injured guard said: "Since the arrival of the army in Mahabad the city has not been thoroughly purged. Even armed Democrats gradually penetrated into the city. Even our required food supply was dropped from the air. In the first days, the Democrats would get involved with the guards. However, as of 2 days ago, they are also attacking the military."

Imampur, the injured guard said: "At least 25 Democrats were killed and 50 injured in the fighting which took place Friday night in Mahabad. Last night again 10 Democrats were killed and 8 injured. The Democrats mostly shoot from the houses and schools and the guards have less chance of fighting back. On the other hand, the PARS correspondent contacted the new governor of Mahabad at 1330 hours yesterday by telephone and inquired about the situation in the city.

The governor said: "As the governor, at present I do not have any executive power in the city and severe shooting is still going on. The city is under economic and military siege and it is in dire need of fuel and oil products. Only three to four bakeries are open in town."

The governor said: "The roads leading to Mahabad are closed and the army is in control of the situation."

Regarding the number of casualties in the past 2 days in Mahabad, the governor said: "It is not possible to provide statistics on the number of casualties and the damage to the city." The PARS correspondent in Sanandaj also talked with a Mahabadi resident by telephone.

This person said: "Following negotiations held between the government representative and some of the Kurdish religious and political leaders, it was agreed that there would be a cease-fire until agreement was reached.

However, unfortunately the fighting started again and at present the city is surrounded by the military and the guards. For the last few days the city of Mahabad has been besieged economically. All of the offices, schools, and the market have been closed for days and nobody dares to leave his house."

Statements made by Imam's representative

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Hosseyn Kermani, Emam Khomeyni's representative in the west of the country told PARS in Kermanshah last night that there had been 74 casualties in the recent events of various cities in the west but that the statistics had not been given to him from reliable sources.

Here, we should point our that yesterday Hojjatoleslam Kermani had told the correspondent that 74 persons had been killed or and injured in the events of Mahabad.

On the other hand, the operations staff of the Pasdaran Corps of the western region stationed in Kermanshah reported to PARS last night that 1 guard was killed and 13 soldiers and guards were injured in the fighting which took place yesterday in Mahabad.

Telegram to Emam

In a telegram to Emam Khomeyni, the leader of Iran's Islamic revolution, the Parent-Student Consultation Board of Mahabad has sent the following message: (A copy of the telegram was received by KEYHAN.)

"The presence of the guards dispatched to Kurdestan has caused demolition and massacre of the Kurdish nation due to religious and ideological narrow—mindedness. We ask the Islamic government of Iran to remove the guards from this area and let the people of this area choose its own guards. Obviously this is not contradictory to holy Islamic rites, human rights, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Iranian government. Otherwise, the Islamic Republic is responsible for the massacres and the demolition of places.

Funeral of two Martyred Guards

Orumiyeh: Funeral ceremonies were held yesterday in the city of Orumiyeh for the two guards who suffered martrydom. One of them, Hosseyn Jamal Kashani was killed in Mahabad the day before yesterday and the other one, Ali Ardalan was killed in Bukan. Hosseyn Jamal Kashani was one of the guards dispatched from Tehran and Ali Ardalan had been dispatched from the city of Bijar in the western part of the country. Many people in Orumiyeh attended the funeral ceremonies.

In an interview with KEYHAN, the provincial governor of Kurdestan announced that important security actions are being taken to study the rumor about two Iraqi divisions being dispatched to the border of Iran.

Kermanshah- KEYHAN Correspondent. The rumor that two Iraqi divisions have been dispatched to the border for the strengthening and controlling of the Iran-Iraqi border is not true.

Yesterday in an interview with KEYHAN, Mohammad Rashid Shakiba, provincial governor of Kordestan said: "I was informed that two Iraqi divisions had been dispatched to the border of Iran and that they were stationed on the border areas of Kordestan. Immediately we held a meeting with the commander of the Kordestan Division and other security officials in the region. After detailed discussions and reviewing aerial photos taken of the area, the news was considered invalid and nothing but a rumor."

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He added: "Of course it is likely that the Iraqis would take action in dispatching troops to the border of Kordestan. However, so far they have not done so, because according to the reports that we have received, the Iraqis themselves have enough problems and involvements in the Kurdish areas of Iraq."

The governor added: "Our sources in the area have reported that a camp is being set up on the other side of the border for the Democrats. The information is 100 percent true. This shows that by establishing a camp and offering other aid the Iraqis are inflaming the differences between the Iranian Kurds and the government."

Regarding other information, he said: "I was informed that the Iraqi Kurds are against giving asylum to Iranian Kurds and that they have admonished them severely saying that staying in Iran is much better than seeking refuge in Iraq because the way the Iraqis treat the Iraqi Kurds is not satisfactory and pleasant at all."

Shakiba said: "In recent years, with full force the Iraqis had cleared the Kurdish inhabited areas in Northern Iraqi of all Kurds, transferring them to warm climates. Naturally, the Iraqi Kurds are not pleased with the Ba'th government. The governor added: The Iraqi action in giving refuge to Iranian Kurds fighting with the Iranian government is similar to the scenario that the deposed shah of Iran played by giving refuge to Mulla Mostafa Barzani and his Kurdish supporters. Later, we saw that with the agreement between the two governments, Mollah Mostafa and the Kurds were sacrificed."

By bringing up the subject of every Iranian Kurd who goes to the other side of the border being given a tent and a specific food ration, the provincial governor said: "We do not approve of this Iraqi po'ry. Now what their aim is from doing so, we do not know."

On the other hand, yesterday Dr Mehr Asa, Governor of Marivan told KEYHAN: "There are rumors in the city of Marivan regarding the dispatch of an Iraqi Division to help Sheykh Osman Naqshbandi, the region's feudal lord. Three days ago Naqshbandi caused an involvement in Darakay village of Marivan."

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He added: "Of course we should accept these rumors with a little doubt and suspicion. I still do not trust it."

The governor added: "The report on the dispatch of the Iraqi Division was given to me by one of the officials of the security forces of the Marivan Police Department. I told him to write down his report and give it to me in order that I could take action about it."

He also said: "Perhaps some other individuals might have come to the help of Sheykh Osman, the region's feudal lord, in the clothes of Iraqi soldiers. We are looking into this matter."

In the end, the governor announced that the man who had been killed 3 days ago in the fighting which took place in Darakay was buried in Marivan today. The attacks of Sheykh Osman Naqshbandi and his son who have armed men at their disposal had been repelled by gendarmerie.

TRAN

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AROUSES INTEREST OF SOVIET MOSLEMS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Oct 79 p 10

[Interview with Dr. Mojtahed Shabestari and Goldzadeh Ghafuri by KEYHAN On Their Retu. From An International Conference of Soviet Moslems]

[Text] In the Soviet Union, the anti-imperialistic aspects of Iran's revolution have been depicted more prominently than its Islamic aspects.

The determination of economic, cultural, and political policies in the Soviet Union is in the hands of the Communist Party.

Soviet Moslems do not have a settled position confronting the socialist revolution. But recently they have manifested great interest in rediscovering their Islamic identity.

In the constitution of the Soviet Union, religions are free, but this freedom is based on the individual aspect of religion, not on the foundation of a social order.

Last week His Reverence Golzadeh Chafuri and His Reverence Mojtahed Shabestari left for Moscow at the head of a committee to take part in an international conference of Soviet Mosloms. We have arranged an interview to inform everyone on the situation of Soviet Moslems and the effect there of Iran's Islamic revolution.

Question: Summarize for us the manner of your in ...ation and trip there.

Answer: They informed us from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the USSR had asked that two of Iran's religious scholars take part in an international conference of Soviet Moslems and they said that Mr Ghafuri and I, would be the ones. We accepted the invitation, and Monday we flew to Moscow; then we went to Dushambe, where conference was held. They gradually assembled from various countries of the world—that is, from 30

countries and Islamic associations, and on Thursday, 21 Shahrivar [12 Sep], the conference began. The subject of the conference was constituted as "The role and Influence of the Moslems of Central Asia in the Growth and Progress of Islamic Thought." The holders of the conference comprised the joing council of the four religious administrations of the USSR's Moslems. The conference lasted 3 days; then the participants in the conference visited some of Dushambe city's industrial establishments, and they also made a trip to view the cities of Samarkand, Bokhara, Tashkent, Ufa, and Baku, which are centers of states inhabited by Moslems. But Iran's delegation did not agree to continue the program beyond Tashkent, since there were duties in Iran for which we were compelled to return early.

Question: What is the extent of the terms of the liberties which Soviet Moslems possess?

Answer: In the 10-day period that we spent in the Soviet Union, there was not enough time for a reply to this question. What we can say in this regard is based on passing impressions that we had in our encounters with Soviet Moslems. On this basis, I should state that the Soviet Moslems' freedom exists to a striking extent, as far as what pertains to the performance of religious duties and observances. But we imagine that it is not an easy task, within the Soviet order, to speak of Islam as a divine universal on which the political and economic and cultural order should be founded. Of two proofs, the first is that it has been stipulated in the constitution of the Soviet Union that the setting of all political, economic and cultural policies of the Soviet Union will be in the hands of the Soviet Communist Part, and it is this party which determines the manner of the progress of socialism in the Soviet Union. This confirms that, in such conditions, one cannot speak of an Islamic society in the sense which we understand in Iran. Admittedly it was stipulated in the same constitution that religions are free, but this freedom is based on the fact that religion is an individual matter and cannot be the basis of a social order. The second proof is this, that socialism in the Soviet Union has striven to array economic justice to a great extent in the dress of production. Hence all the Soviet people, including Moslems, do not feel so much deficiency in what relates to their material wants. And for this reason there do not arise any powerful motives for them to create another new social order. My conclusion was this: Only in the event that there should arise a profound spiritual concept of man and the completeness of man in the shape of a cultural thirst or wave and the Soviet Moslems were not content with the securing of material needs, would the ground be prepared for a cultural movement that would be based on a new social order.

Question: Does the Islam which dominates the Soviet Moslems have the aspect of a custom or of true Islam?

Answer: Approximately in the same way that has been related in answer to

the second question, the Islam dominant over the Soviet Moslems has been barred to a great extent from all policies relating to the social, economic, and political side, and the Moslems there are not of a mind to speak of a new society in the name of Islam. My conclusion was this, that they do not have a settled position toward the socialist revolution. But we also followed with one further point and that is this, that in these recent years Soviet Moslems have shown a greater interest in rediscovering their Islamic identity in the sense of a connection with the rest of the world's Moslems. And they were very desirous of being informed about conditions in other Islamic countries. From this attitude, we can say that an Islamic movement is being observed there among the Moslems.

Question: What is the method of propagating the religion there?

Answer: What I found on this subject was that more than 2,000 official and semiofficial scholars of the religion take part in sermons and preaching in mosques and houses on various Islamic occasions. They have also established some theological schools in which some of them learn the Islamic sciences. And overall four clerical administrations hold on their hands the reins of religious affairs as the central apparatus of the Moslem religious organizations. Details respecting this matter can be summarized in the address of the grand mufti of the Soviet Moslems which was delivered on the first day of the conference; I have produced the complete text of that address in issue No 5 of ISLAMIC THOUGHT, 11 Mehr [2 Oct].

Question: How are the relations of the Soviet government with the Moslems, and is the clergy there dependent on the government or independent?

Answer: I observed there that, at least in these recent years, the clergy does not encounter so much difficulty in the process of developing their activities (in that sense of Islam which has been noted). Of course they carry out their programs with the knowledge of the government bureaus. From a financial standpoint, the clergy there is independent; that is, its affairs are administered out of the payment of voluntary religious gifts. One thing which was quite noticable was that the relations of Soviet Moslems and the Soviet government cannot be separated from the Soviet government's relations with Islamic countries. In this sense, in which the Soviet Moslems have an intense concern, they may strengthen their connection with the world of Islam. But this matter will be effected in a way subject to the Soviet government's agreement that its foreign policy should be on the basis of the need for good relations with Islamic countries.

Iran's revolution and the Soviet Moslems

Question: What is the effect of Iran's revolution on the state of mind of the Soviet Moslems, and their reaction to our revolution?

Answer: IN meeting with us, the Moslems there were showing great interest in Iran's revolution. They were asking us many things, but the problem of lack of time and in many places the problem of language prevented our complete mutual understanding. Some people related that scenes of the demonstrations of the people of Iran and of the support to resistance against the saturic regime were disseminated regularly by film and broadcasts over Soviet radio and television. Films on this subject were also shown in the cinemas.

But it was clear that the information of the brothers and sisters there excludes the Islamic details and particulars of this revolution. In one of the theological schools for the training of students in the religious sciences at Boukhara, in a conversation I had with some students I returned to this same point, that their information excluded the particulars of our revolution. In the Soviet Union the anti-imperialistic aspects of Iran's revolution have been depicted more prominently than its Islamic particulars. Of course, this was not unexpected by us, since in the Soviet Union all matters of this kind are publicized in this context.

Question: Recently a dramatic series about Iran's revolution has been publicly presented in the Soviet Union. In your opinion, to what extent may these events be significant?

Answer: We were not aware of the circumstances of the Islamic theaters that have been started there recently. But we can say decisively that the establishing of such theaters is a response to the Soviet Moslems' thirst for the information which is provided regarding the conditions of the world's Moslems, and it is very significant.

Question: What general impressions do you have of Soviet society?

Answer: As I have said, 10 days is a short period, and also our contacts during this period were limited because of the abundance of programs. Thus one cannot answer this question in a satisfactory manner. Our superficial impression was that socialism in the Soviet Union esteems itself as to some degree successful in what relates to economic justice, and that the chief suffering of people there lies in the fact that this same socialism (successful from the economic viewpoint) does not deem itself successful in the field of responding to the longings of the striving intellect of the people. And so I think that the liberties which have been granted to religious activities, especially in recent years, to a great extent are with the intention of compensating for this lack. In this regard, it comes to mind that Soviet thinkers are in the process of a renewal of thought in many of its traditional modes, and they are trying to alleviate the dangerous dogmatism in which the founders of the society had been trapped. One cannot say that human problems have been resolved in that society; the truth is that we can say that there, too, new experiments are in the process of creation.

IRAN

OIL MINISTER ADVISES CAUTION IN NIOC PURGE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Oct 79 p 12

[Text] "For years, the Iranian people have sat next to the fire and have not been pure or single with one another," said the petroleum minister yesterday at Abadan. "In our society, there has been meanness, flattery and bootlicking. The opportunity to reflect on our misfortune would not exist except for a miracle which came to break down the barriers and bring us nearer to each other." According to a PARS reporter who was present at the Abadan club where Mr Moinfar addressed a meeting of oil industry workers and employees, the minister concluded his opening remarks by saying that "the old regime when it came into existence took away our opportunity to think, so that we did not have the opportunity to reflect on our misfortune."

Moinfar spoke of the early days of the Islamic revolution, and the support given by the oil workers. He said that the cutoff in oil exports "was a heavy blow against despotism and imperialism, but it also led to domestic unrest and endangered the people's winter fuel supplies. Under Imam Khomeyni's orders, by exercising real discipline you ensured that domestic requirements were met, so that Iran's eye was clear and the enemy's eye was clouded. If I called you brothers earlier and referred to your exploits, it was with good reason." Moinfar said that "last year you, the people of Abadan, witnessed the deadly fire at the Rex Cinema. You saw our martyrs burned up in the flames. Since the revolution, we have lost more martyrs, such as the Revolutionary Guards who went into danger and fell, wallowing in their own blood. We lost martyrs like Motaheri, but Iran still stands on its own two feet, and is advancing toward freedom and self-esteem and happiness. We have the legacy of Islamic culture as an example, and follow neither the banner of East nor West. The Prophet is our example. We have a great culture, which we want to pass down to our descendants. A nation w' ch has the culture of Islam and the martyrs of Karbala wants to express this culture to the world. Its enemies are not only the son of Reza Khan, but also imperialism and Zionism, as well as the former agents of SAVAK."

Moinfar, referring to discrimination in the oil company, said, "Let us set aside words like 'worker' and 'employee' and stress the fact that we are public servants, not a special class." Regarding a purge of the oil company ranks, an issue which was raised by several of the workers, he stressed the

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need to look at both sides of the question. "We must distinguish between those who served the previous regime because of weakness, and those who actually were traitors to the people. Those weak individuals who were guilty of crimes under the old regime can possibly now follow the revolutionary path and do a good job. Do not condemn an individual just because he is not pious or has not acted piously. I agree with you on the need for reform, but I do not want to make it so strict that no employees are left tomorrow."

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IRAN

#### MINISTER DISCUSSES BAN ON AGRICULTURAL IMPORT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Oct 79 p 9

[Text] Minister of Agriculture, 'Ali Mohammad 'Izadi, went to Mashad for a seminar on prevention of agricultural pasts and crop protection, and the agricultural problems of Khorassan Province. At a meeting of the employees of the province's General Directorate of Agriculture, in describing agriculture's important role in the national economy and enumerating the tasks of agricultural engineers and specialists, he said: "A vistory for agriculture is a victory for the revolution. By the same token, we must act in a revolutionary manner in agricultural work and providing foodstuffs to the people. In satisfaction of this expectation, we will have nothing except God's satisfaction."

Next he referred to the increase in agricultural production, saying that "this year the wheat and barley crop is up 7 percent, oranges 12 percent, beets 9 percent and poultry 120 percent." He expressed the hope that, with sufficient credits, agricultural programs would continue to move ahead.

The minister said that "the Ministry of Agriculture has presented 80 bills to the Council of State and the Revolutionary Council. One of these bills was for the establishment of local banks in the villages, which would be run by the village councils with the participation of local supporters and the help of the people. These banks can help insure the villages against floods, earthquakes and other disasters."

At the seminar's opening ceremonies, the minister also attached particular importance to the quarantine and banning of agricultural imports as a defense against pests. He cited the example of the orange stemborer and the enormous expenditures required to combat it, which makes clear the importance of the quarantine and said: "We will prohibit agricultura" mports as long as we have to."

The Minister spoke of the important role played by agriculture professors and researchers in promoting the use of correct and scientific methods in agriculture. "The continuing growth of population forces society to increase agricultural production. One way to increase output is to cut down on losses caused by pests, which in somecases amount to 40 percent of the total crop. More work is needed on the use of sprays and insecticides and the relationship between ecological factors and the insect population."

He stressed that more attention must be paid to production of food crops such as wheat, oranges, sugar beets, oilseeds and other vegetables.

"Equipping the quarantine sections with more personnel and resources at the ports and airfields, as well as farms and orchards within the country, are at the head of the list of steps which the quarantine organization ought to implement."

The minister said that the senseless increase in poisons being used in Iran has turned the country into a dumping ground for foreign companies and a large-scale, cheap laboratory for them. Experts should study ways of limiting the range of poisons in use."

He concluded his remarks by emphasizing that the seminar should continue its work towards the above objectives and also the improvement of ground and airborne spraying systems.

At the seminar, the general director of agriculture for the province presented statistics on crops under cultivation in Khorassan and the losses caused by pests and parasites. He added: "With the prevention of pest- and parasiterelated losses of fruit, sugar beets and sheep, the country will gain about 11.4 billion rivals." Dr Movasghi, head of the Plant Conservation Organization, also spoke about pest prevention. Taher Ahmadzadeh, governor of Khorassan Province, addressed the seminar. He spoke, among other things, about credit facilities for farmers. He added that other rural centers, such as sugar factories, could obtain loans in any amount desired within 2 hours.

IRAQ

#### BRIEFS

ECONOMIC PROTOCOL WITH YUGOSLAVIA--Belgrade, 15 Nov--Iraq and Yugoslavia signed a protocol here tonight on economic, technical and scientific cooperation for 1980. The protocol aims at promoting trade exchange; increasing Iraqi exports to Yugoslavia; developing relations in industry, oil industry and construction; and increasing training opportunities and exchange of expertise in the fields of scientific and technical cooperation and in transport. The protocol comes at the conclusion of the fifth session of the Iraqi-Yugoslav joint committee, which began on Monday, headed by Iraqi RCC member and Trade Minister Hasan 'Ali and Yugoslav Vice President of the Federal Executive Council Zvone Dragan, who signed the protocol. [Text] [JN152114 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2050 GMT 15 Nov 79 JN]

ISRAEL

### BRIEFS

SAMARITAN QUARTERS IN NABULUS--Jordan will give the young Samaritans of Nabulus 20,000 dinars for the construction of apartments in the Samaritan quarter. This is reported by the Samaritan organ ALEF-BET. The promise was given to a Samaritan delegation visiting Amman which was received by Jordanian Information Minister 'Adnan Abu-'Awdah. The minister also promised them a periodic allowance of 100 dinars per year from 1967 if they submit an official application. A member of the delegation said that the Jordanian offer was welcomed because the Israeli military government has never consented to similar request made by the Samaritans. [Text] [TA191724 Jerudalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 19 Nov 79 TA]

JORDAN

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NCC DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES POLICY

JN121718 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 12 Nov 79 JN

[Text] The National Consultative Council [NCC] met today. NCC Chairman Ahmad al-Lawzi presided over the session which was attended by Prime Minister Mudar Badran and the ministers. The NCC discussed the government's supplies policy and its recent measures to increase the prices of grains and fodder.

The government made a detailed and comprehensive statement on the government's supplies policy. The statement was discussed by NCC members.

Several NCC members discussed the government's supplies policy as outlined in the statement. Prime Minister Mudar Badran spoke in answer to queries by several NCC members on the state's supplies policy. He said: The main reason for the increase in prices in Jordan, as elsewhere throughout the world, is due to the continual increase in the world prices of oil. This is especially true in view of the fact that we are not an oil-producing state and in view of the increase by industrial states of the prices of their products by a greater proportion than the increase in oil prices.

The prime minister said: The basic and ideal solution to the rising price increases lies in adopting a clear and stable production policy and doubling food production—both animal and vegetable production.

The prime minister added: The government has taken a number of measures to implement this policy.

Answering a remark on the government subsidizing supplies from the aid given by the Arab states, Mudar Badran said: We refuse to allocate such aid for financing supplies because this aid has been earmarked to strengthen Jordan's intrinsic power, defend the Arab nation and confront the dangers facing it. Our people are aware of this and are aware of the facts. The day will come when we shall show what has been achieved in the way of developing our intrinsic power.

Mudar Badran added: The state's local revenues, which totaled 180 million dinars only, do not enable us to subsidize supplies adequately in light of world price increases, especially as our imports totaled about 500 million dinars. In spite of this, the government has been able to provide the citizens with the basic commodities at reasonable prices and has succeeded in eliminating the phenomenon of quequeing,

SUDAN

POLITICAL LEADERS ANALYZE RECENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, STRIKES

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 5, 6 & 8 Oct 79

[Interview With Key Sudanese Figures by Ghassan Sharbil: "On-The-Spot Tour of Sudanese Continent; First Vice President: Student Demonstrations Exploited Unconditional Aid; No Egyptian Forces; Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi: Reconciled Non-Participant; Against Camp David, Integration and Opposition From Abroad; Al-Turabi: Reconciled Participant; Opposition From Abroad Is Futile"; Part I of this Four-Part Series Carried in the 4 Oct 79 Issue of AL-NAHAR pp 1, 9 Not Translated]

[5 Oct 79 pp 1, 9]

[Text] Khartoum—The regime in Sudan considers what happened in August a transient crisis that will result in no political consequences and that it is a purely economic problem. Beyond this, you ask him [presumably first vice president] about Camp David and he refers you to President Numayri's reservations. He stresses that there are no Egyptian forces in Sudan now. Regarding the relations with Ethiopia, he refers you to the Freetown meeting between President Numayri and Mengistu and stresses the need to find a solution to the Eritrean problem. Regarding aid from the [Arab] Gulf and the conditions for this aid, he says there are no conditions.

Gen 'Abd-al-Majid Hamid Khalil, the first vice president and the minister of defense explained this in an interview with AL-NAHAR.

[Question] What is the truth of the recent incidents in Sudan and is Sudan on the threshold of important political and economic transformations?

[Answer] The talk about incidents or a popular revolution in Sudan is, regrettably, tendentious propaganda aimed against ...dan first and against the Sudanese regime second because Sudan refuses to be persuaded by certain ideologies that are spreading the current rumors. The said ideologies were hit in the past and are rejected by the Sudanese people who refuse systems imported from abroad. First, I would like to assure you that the Sudanese people have no political problem. The experiences that took place have proved this fact. The Sudanese will be united in confronting all the attempts to topple the regime, whether those attempts made on the instructions of major powers or those on the instructions of minor states.

What happened in recent days is no more than demonstrations by students of the first secondary stage. It is our opinion that the demonstrations were exploited by some elements hostile to the regime, be they communist or Ba' thist elements opposed to the reconciliation or elements disowned by the revolution for reasons that they know. These elements infiltrated the ranks of the students whom we refuse to confront with anything but wisdom despite the damage they caused on the instigation of the intruding elements, such as the destruction of vehicles. The regime's tolerance and its refusal to confront the demonstrations with any violence have allowed the information media hostile to Sudan to convey a distorted picture of what took place, implying that Sudan was in turmoil whereas the truth is that order was prevalent, foreigners were touring the streets until the morning without any guard and the embassies were aware of this. We asked the embassies to make these facts known. Some refugees and homelss people took part in the demonstrations with the aim of looting. The whole issue ended in 24 hours.

Naturally, there is another aspect that must be discussed. Those incidents may have coincided with some living crises. We, as a regime, acknowledge the presence of these crises which have their causes.

Another reason for the incidents is that the state has undertaken a plan to amend and re-classify the civil service jobs as the greatest accomplishment of the revolution's recent history. Such a civil service system has not been implemented so far in more than four or five countries. The natural result of the salary increases, which have amounted in some cases to 50 percent, has been a rabid increase in prices that have absorbed the salary raises. As a consequence, the disturbances took place. These are the limits of what has happened: Inflation and the unavailability of some commodities. As for the talk about political incidents, it is mere exaggeration and wishes.

As a result of the direct meetings held by President Numayri to correct the course, we have had the changes in the Socialist Union, the reductior in the number of its agencies and of the people working in them and the introduction of the principle of voluntary political action. The Socialist Union is now operating according to the new system, with full conviction from all the people's sectors and in a way that may lead us to our ideal political organization. There is no disagreement over the basic principles and the debate has always been over the actions. The cabinet reshuffle took place in this climate. It is normal for a reshuffle to take place every now and then in order to meet the requirements of the phase. Perhaps the cabinet reshuffles we have in our country are, in comparison to all the countires around us, almost insignificant [in number]. Speedy measures had to be taken to eliminate the people's suffering. The recent financial reforms, of which the entire world has heard, were carried out. We are proud that the traces of these measures were felt within no more than 2 weeks. Commodities have become available and prices have dropped considerably. Establishments monopolizing commodities were stormed and it became evident that they had horded vast quantities of food supplies.

Measures have also been taken against the black market merchants and the citizens have been made aware of the need to help the government to expose the manipulators. For example, meat prices have dropped by nearly 30 percent and we have supplied oil derivatives, thus reducing the phenomenon of long lines.

Officers' Demands

[Question] It has been said that the high-ranking [army] officers demanded certain reforms during their meetings with President Numayri and with you. Is there an inclination to escalate the army's role in the political life?

[Answer] The discussions of the officers during their meeting with the president and with me never deviated from the president's talk about correcting the political and administrative course. In both meetings, the officers blessed the path followed by the president to correct whatever is impeding the procession. First, the officers did not submit any demands but expressed their opinions which were within the frameworks projected by the president. As to what you want to insinuate about their asking the president to ouster certain personalities, this is not the character or role of the officers.

I don't know why the appointment of the minister of defense and general commander of the armed forces as the first vice president has been given the meaning of a change in the regime. It seems that the circles that attribute this meaning assume that the move is military. The answer is that all the members of the armed forces are, by virtue of the political organization, members of the Sudanese Socialist Union. They are one out of five groups forming the people's forces alliance. The appointment of an officer on active duty in the armed forces [to a civilian position] is normal and codified constitutionally. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that for the first time in Sudan's history since the May 1969 revolution, the participation of the armed forces in the political system—as an inseparable group in the alliance and a group that cannot be isolated from the masses—has been codified within the framework of military discipline, laws and traditions.

No Egyptian Forces

 $\left[ \text{Question} \right]$  Are there still Egyptian forces in Sudan and what is their role specifically?

[Answer] I would like to assure you that there are no Egyptian forces in Sudan. In accordance with the joint defense agree nt, we would not conceal such a thing if the forces were present. As we were with the Egyptian forces in the Sinai and as we were in Kuwait and Lebanon, I do not believe that there is cause for disgrace if an Arab force is with us, should the need arise. However, this is not happening now because the joint defense agreement stipulates that one state will participate if the other state is exposed to an aggression. Moreover, this commitment is binding to all the Arab countries in accordance with the Arab League agreements. If Sudan is exposed to danger,

will it not be the duty of the Arab countries to proceed to support it? What is being rumored about the presence of Egyptian forces in Sudan is pure illusions. The [joint defense] treaty is aimed against foreign attacks and has nothing to do with the regime, as some people imagine, because the regime is protected by the people's forces with their alliance, including the armed forces, and they are able to defend it.

[Question] You have depicted the recent crisis as being the outcome of certain economic measures. What is the status of the political situation and where has the reconciliation reached?

[Answer] First, the recent incidents have not affected the reconciliation atmosphere or the relations between the reconciliated parties because the incidents took place within the framework that I have pointed out. Moreover, the reconciliation is proceeding with persistent steps made by those who have accepted it--I am referring here to brother al-Sadiq al-Mahdi--and who are working with us on the basis of the following fundamental convictions and principles: Sudan's unity and refraining from the resumption of conflict and from providing the opportunity to any force hostile to Sudan and to its stability, be it a domestic or a foreign force. Any reconciliation must proceed carefully and without any haste, as long as good intentions prevail, confidence is firmly established and the national interest is the sole goal. I am telling you from a position of responsibility that all the brothers that have been reconciled and that have actually returned to Sudan are working with us with utter sincerity and devotion for the enhancement and prosperity of the country. As for those who have not been reconciled, you can read what they publish abroad. The fact that they are abroad and far from the country makes them unaware of what is happening in Sudan.

This has been the situation concerning the brothers who have returned, familiarized themselves with the situation and participated in Sudan's problems and concerns with the goal of attaining solutions that are unknown to those who are remote from the stage and who receive misleading reports. Perhaps our success in the recent measures that have been lauded by the citizens and by the entire world is what has caused these groups to escalate their campaigns [against us] in a race with time. But we are in a race with development and reform and we will leave these people behind us. They will never catch up with us or be able to harm us.

## Reservations

[Question] The official Sudanese statements regarding Camp David are ambiguous abroad and few inside Sudan. So, what is Sudan's position, especially after normalization of the Egyptian-Israeli relations, and is integration with Egypt going ahead?

[Answer] Sudan's positions vis-a-vis Camp David are clear and the leader president has underlined them on more than one occasion. The reservations expressed by Sudan are evident and the principles within which Sudan believes the solution should be achieved are clear, unambiguous and require no explanation. We are convinced that the Arab territories must be returned

to their legitimate owners, that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative [of the Palestinian people] and that Jerusalem is Arab. Because Sudan's positions are clear, they have had no impact on the reconciliation and on other issues contrary to what some people rumor. On the other hand, the economic, social and cultural integration [with Egypt] is proceeding with ceaseless steps. I would like to point out here that integration with the fraternal Egypt is, in accordance with Sudan's philosophy, a step toward an integration that includes the Arab sisters and is not, and will not be, a pivotal integration. Two days ago, I announced that we hope to achieve integration between the Red Sea Province and Jiddah, in the fraternal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and so forth.

(Khalil prefers not to embark on the alternatives to Camp David and on the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue and prefers not to anticipate matters prematurely.)

#### Ethiopian Neighbor

[Question] Are the Sudanese-Ethopian relations still stranded in the Eritrean station, especially in the wake of the failure of the Freetown summit?

[Answer] Principally, we seek good neighborly relations. We have sought to improve our relations with Ethiopia and we worked for the Freetown meeting between President Numayri and Mengistu. This meeting has not produced the desired results because the crux of the difference lies in the Eritrean problem which, we believe, must be solved. We have not imposed a solution on Ethiopia but we believe that there has to be a solution because, like it or not, we are affected by the hundreds of thousands of [Eritrean] refugees. You in Lebanon are aware of the consequences of such an issue. Perhaps Ethiopia has a different opinion, even though the entire world, the refugee aid [presumably meaning UNRWA] and all views on this issue underline the presence of a problem which, we hope, Ethiopia will settle peacefully.

A meeting was also held in Monrovia between the president and the Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs. The signs there were good and underlined the continued dialogue as a principle for solving the problems. There is conviction in the need to proceed toward normal relations. We on our part have clear positions and we hope that all states will work the way we are working because we believe in non-intervention in the affairs of others and in the OAU principles, we denounce foreign intervention, especially in the African continent, and we hope that the citizens of this continent will be given the opportunity to settle their problems within the framework of the OAU and its charters.

# Arab Summit

[Question] What is Sudan's position vis-a-vis Lebanon's call for an Arab summit to discuss southern Lebanon exclusively, especially since you were commander of the Sudanese unit operating within the Arab Deterrence Forces?

[Answer] Arab movement is as necessary as uniting the Lebanese will first. It is my belief that the Lebanese are better aware than us of what is happening in their country. The solutions and initiatives deemed appropriate by President Sarkis are the outcome of living with the problem on the spot. An Arab summit, even a mini-summit, can perhaps offer something, at least psychologically, because it will give Lebanon the feeling that it is not isolated. We may perhaps not be interested in a mini-summit but such a summit was held in the past and did offer something. We support the efforts to help Lebanon and we have no objection to any step within the framework of Arab solidarity.

#### Loans and Conditions

[Question] Monies in the form of loans have begun to reach Sudan from international organizations and Arab countries. Have there been any conditions imposed for the delivery of this money?

[Answer] There are absolutely no conditions. In this regard, we hope that observers will seek the facts.

[6 Oct 79, pp 1, 9]

[Text] If you mention al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's name, people remember the Nation's Party, al-Ansar [Partisans] Sect, the National Front, the 1976 incidents, especially near the Libyan borders, and the series of bloody clashes with President Numayri's regime before everything else. However, people tell me that many things have changed in the stances of the opposition and of the regime after the Port Sudan reconciliation between Numayri and al-Sadiq on 7 July 1977. Al-Sadiq has returned to Omdurman, has written articles in papers and has given lectures. However, his current position is delicate becasue he is a reconciled non-participant," as he has said. For him to become a reconciled participant, the regime has to take some difficult steps.

Al-Sadiq has "fundamental observations" concerning the foreign and domestic policies and these observations are coupled with a conviction that prevents their transformation into an action program on whose basis he can agree with the unreconciled opposition. He does not now approve action to topple the regime from abroad because such action requires, in his view, aid from close or remote countries and results, as a consequence, in the participation of foreign wills in the Sudanese affairs. Al-Sadiq's weapon is his experience. He believes that a return to partisanship and factionalism will destroy Sudan and he calls for acknowledging that the regime has spread an atmosphere of democracy after the reconciliation.

Al-Sadiq spoke frankly to AL-NAHR about Sudan's situation, his position and the reasons for his opposition to integration with Egypt in the form in which this integration is projected currently. Here is the text of the interview:

Common Denominator

[Question] What is the truth of the recent incidents and is Sudan on the threshold of important political and economic changes?

[Answer] We must define the incidents that took place recently. The incidents you are referring to are the strikes of al-Jazirah farmers, the strikes of the railroad workers and the demonstrations staged by the students of secondary schools. All these incidents have direct causes. Al-Jazirah workers strike was staged in protest of the tax levied on the water irrigating their crops. The railroad workers stike came as a result of stopping the second raise stipulated by the "job emendment and classification The student strikes and demonstrations took place because inflation, the black market and the unavailability of commodities have affected them and their guardians. What made matters worse was a sudden increase, amounting to 66 percent, in fuel costs which resulted in higher transportation fees. The students marched spontaneously to protest the economic deterioriation and they expressed their wrath at the aforementioned measures by semi-revolutionary actions: Obstructing traffic and harassing private vehicles. These are the incidents. Inflation is the common denominator between all the moves that have taken place. The enormous inflation and the black market's domination are two sufficient reasons to increase the rasies, not stop them. There is also no doubt that supplies were distributed unfairly. Some people ended with a big share and others had no share at all. The incidents can be considered a protest against the state's economic policy. The official inflation rate is 25 percent but the value of the Sudanese pound has shrunk to one tenth what it was [a few] years ago. In addition to inflation, there is the scarcity of goods, the shipping bottlenecks and the distribution problems. The problems doubled when the officials sold the shares to the black market merchants [sic]. Imported commodities are very expensive, and so are local commodites.

It has been said, for example, that the recent incidents are communits [-instigated]. I believe that they are incidents that had nothing to do with any foreign planning but are rather reactions to the conditions that we have mentioned. They have nothing to do with foreign circles, except that some of these circles have tried to attribute the incidents to themselves unfairly.

On Threhold of Changes

Yes, I think that everyone in Sudan believes that Sudan is on the threshold of important political changes, even President Numavri projects the issue of change in his questions. The change that the star projects can be contained within the framework of the questions raised by President Numayri. The state acknowledges that big mistakes have been committed and that big problems exist. It is trying to introduce reforms, such as the reforms that have taken place in the Socialist Union, in the cabinet and in the provinces.

[Question] You are reconciled and you are present in Sudan. Are you ready to accept a government position?

[Answer] I am not ready to take part in any government position because I do not believe that the current level of reform is enough to deal with the existing problems. I have believed and I continue to believe that what we need is not a partial reform of the conditions but a fundamental change of these conditions. I describe this fundamental change as a new beginning to deal with the country's conditions. For example, insofar as the political organization is concerned, I believe that it should be dissolved and that a new comprehensive popular organization should be formed. I have already submitted proposals in this regard. Insofar as the economic and development policy is concerned, I do not believe that what is projected is enough. Concerning the foreign policy, I believe that it should be frank and clear. I do not approve action through the current Socialist Union. There should be a single and comprehensive democratic popular organization which should be completely different from the said Socialist Union.

#### Camp David

[Question] Can you explain to us how the Sudanese foreign policy can be clear on the Camp David issue. What, in your opinions, are the effects of the offical position toward Camp David?

[Answer] Our policy should be frank and clear in condemning the two Camp David accords and in abandoning any dealings with the Egyptian regime that has bought a part of its regional interests and sold the Arab cause and that has normalized its relations with Israel while Israel continues to occupy Arab territories and to deny the Palestinian people's rights. For these reasons, any relation with this regime must be abandoned. I believe that the stance toward Camp David has denied Sudan its traditional role in uniting the Arab ranks and realizing Arab solidarity—a role always founded on the basis of concern for the Arab right. In the stance toward Camp David, Sudan should have been eager to join Arab solidarity and to explain to the Egyptian regime the terms on which it could cooperate with it.

[Question] And the policy of integration with Egypt?

[Answer] The principle of integration with Egypt is a sound principle. But we do not want this integration to be polarized. We want it to be open to all the Arab states with which we have ties and interests. The integration that is being trumpeted by some people who say that Sudan has the natural resources and Egypt has the expertise is rejected altogether. Sudan is presently the source of professional and technical skills and is competing in the Arab labor market. The view that we only have the land is not a sound one. Sudan should be integrated with the countries with whom a true partnership can be established in certain economic activities. Insofar as integration with Egypt at present is concerned, there is an obstacle, namely that Egypt has normalized its relations with Israel. There is a major political obstacle. I believe that this should constitute the end to any integration. But we should continue to talk. Egypt is facing big problems. One of the failures which we can attribute to ourselves as an Arab nation is the lack of sufficient concern for the critical Egyptian situation. In

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Egypt, the cultivable land cannot be increased and the industrial endeavors have not succeeded. Therefore, what has been required is an integration organized by the Arab states to rescue Egypt. This is the true meaning of any integration, i.e. integration for rescue under difficult conditions.

#### Ethiopia

[Question] How do you view the relations with the neighboring countries, especially with Ethiopia?

[Answer] Insofar as our relations with our neighbors are concerned, regardless of the regimes they have, I would like to draw attention to a very important issue. Sudan borders eight countries and it must exert efforts to have cordial, or at least unantagonistic, relations with them. Sudan is a vast country and maintaining its security is a political matter, i.e. it is achieved through understanding and not with military presence on the borders because such a presence is impossible.

Sudan's relations with Ethiopia can be founded on the basis that Sudan seek a peaceful settlement to the Eritrean issue. But Ethiopia must be dealt with in accordance with the international and African charters. Regardless of our sentiments toward the Eritreans, we cannot realize the Eritrean demands with our force. Humanely, we can be a refuge for the refugees, and this is true [happening]. We can also mediate for a peaceful solution. But we must not and cannot adopt the Eritrean issue with force. Our fundamental duty in our country is to be concerned with good neighborly relations with Ethiopia on the basis of the agreements between us.

### Reconciliation

[Question] What has the reconciliation achieved in the 2 years since its announcement?

[Answer] The view toward this issue should be realistic. The reconciliation has achieved the following:

First, replaced violence and oppression by free dialogue.

Second, established bridges of understanding between yesterday's foes.

Third, given the people reasonable liberties to discuss their issues.

Fourth, made it possible to hold the elections for the People's Assembly, the local people's assemblies and the unions. These have been relatively free elections.

Fifth, eliminated the sharp hostilities between the regime in Sudan and some of the neighboring countries, such as Libya.

Sixth, enabled both sides to reach a reconciliation program that was actually announced in Sudan in July 1978, even though it has not been implemented.

The current position is as follows: Had the program been implemented, this would have led to participation and fusion in one form between us and the regime. The failure to implement is what explains our current stance. We are reconciled but we are not participants. We are reconciled in the sense that we have replaced violence and oppression by freedom. We are not participants in the sense that we criticize the regime's policies and that we believe that dealing with the problems requires, as I have already pointed out, a more fundamental direction.

Relationship with al-Hindi

[Question] What is the current relationship between you and al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi and what are the possibilities and horizons of agreement?

[Answer] Brother al-Sharif al-Hindi took part with us in the reconciliation decision and was part of the National Front when the reconciliation was agreed upon. He later decided to oppose the reconciliation. We believe that he is opposing in such a way as if Sudan was still in 1976 or 1977. At that time, there was no dialogue and no freedom for any side in Sudan and the Sudanese regime was proceeding entirely toward an axis with Egypt. Those conditions have changed and it is no longer right at all that the regime te opposed with action from abroad or through alliances with a foreign circle. In this regard, brother al-Hindi issued a joint statement with the Iraqi Ba'th Party. We approve the relations with the Iraqi Ba'th within the framework of confronting al-Sadat's defeatist policies and within the frameworl. of figting Zionism and colonialism. But we see no logic at all for any Sudanese party's alliance with the Iraqi Ba'th for any other reasons. The circumstances under which the Ba'th Party was formed in the Arab East are totally different from Sudan's circumstances. The Ba'th proceeds, for example, from a visualization of Arabism that is almost independent of Islam and existing by itself. Sudan must understand Arabism within a cultural and civilizational framework first and a framework bound to Islam second. The Ba'th has cut short the path to power wherever it has ruled whereas Sudan has a degree of political awareness and diversity that does not permit such methods [Ba'thist coups]. There must be a kind of democracy and participation in Sudan.

We do not understand how the segment of the Sudanese political movement led by brother Husayn al-Hindi has reached such an alliance.

[8 Oct 79 pp 1, 10]

[Text] Khartoum--The Muslim Brotherhood is reconciled and a participant. It controls at present most of the Sudanese higher education institutes and it considers this the beginning of an Islamic tide in Sudan. It views the Iranian change with interest. The Brotherhood rejects Camp David and opposition from abroad. It is brought closer to the regime by the "escalating Islamic direction in the regime's approach" and is moved further away from the communists and the Ba'thists by "their non-Islamic approaches."

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Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the grand master of the Muslim Brotherhood [in Sudan], holds at present the post of attorney general, or minister of justice. In an interview with  $\Lambda$ l-NAHAR, Dr al-Turabi has reviewed the recent incidents, the domestic and foreign policies and the reconciliation.

[Question] What is the truth of the recent incidents in Sudan and is Sudan on the threshold of significant political and economic changes?

[Answer] The incidents that took place in Sudan recently were limited. They arose as a result of hard economic conditions due, on the one hand, to interpretation mistakes in the economic planning and economic policies and due, on the other hand, to passing and trasient conditions that engulfed Sudan, such as floods that swept away the new railroads.

Such incidents cannot but be reflected at the political level. The official media did actually try to attribute them to some circles hostile to the regime whereas those circles tried to depict the incidents as a fundamental ailment in the regime and the beginning of a popular movement aimed against the regime. Abroad, where the information picture has continued to be unfair to Sudan, the theory that depicts the incidents in a political light and that overemphasizes and their significance has prevailed.

As for the economic problem, it is inevitable but to acknowledge its presence, even though the country has overcome the sharp crisis. Meanwhile, the political crisis hardly exists. If the regime's political base were threatened, it would have been possible to exploit and develop these incidents. But the political conditions in the country are stable and the circles hostile to the regime have no noteworthy base with which to fight the regime and have no cause behind which to rally the people against the regime. All that these circles can do is to exploit such incidents to engage in information distortions against the regime.

The gist of it all is that the regime is stable politically and that it is suffering the effects of mistakes in its economic policy and of international and local conditions that influence the country's economy. A person cannot at all exclude the possibility that if the economic crisis deteriorates it will undermine the political regime's safety. But the existing stability is capable of overcoming transient crises and it is hoped that the economic problem will be overcome in not the too distant future, if not shortly.

I expect the political development in Sudan to persist and to lead to a tangible change in the country's political conditions in the long run. But Sudan is not facing at present a political cour or a fundamental change in its political conditions. The political stability has (spread) with the occurrence of transformations in the system reflecting an Islamic political direction in the country, with popular and democratic openness and with the instatement of the political and technical capabilities in leading positions in the country. All this will constitute a systematic change that will take place within the existing framework without producing any disturbance in the country's political procession.

Reconciliation and Opposition

[Question] What is the status of the reconciliation now that 2 years have passed on it and what, consequently, are the opposition's conditions?

[Answer] The elements that were reconciled 2 years ago have agreed to adopt the existing political system and the Sudanese Socialist Union as the basis for the nation's political and popular representation. It has been especially agreed on the need for the unity of the political vessel [organization] for fear of retreat to partisanship and factionalism because they will lead to grave economic harm and will end up, as we have already experienced, in total collapse. The parties will fight and the result is well-known. The reconciled parties may disagree on the form, name and structures of the political organization and on the nature of the thought it carries and whether it is western socialist, eastern or Islamic thought. This is something that will be settled through domestic interaction in which the will of the masses shall become clear because the political organization shall truly reflect popular will on the entire matter. There is nothing to prevent forming or developing the organization in accordance with the popular will. The political organization has actually developed to a large degree since the reconciliation and it has absorbed elements and inclinations that were unknown to it previously. It has also criticized many of the bureacratic aspects and aspects of (decisions-from-above) that accompanied the organization in its early days. It is now in the process of developing. As I have already pointed out, what is projected on the Sudanese arena is to develop the conditions without restrictions, but also without violence.

[Question] Can we define more precisely your relationship with the regime and with its opponents?

[Answer] We are in a state of interaction with authority. It is customary, in any political authority established on the difference of parties, for a party opposing the policies of any ruling regime to be outside the regime and to work to topple it either constitutionally or by force and for whoever is within the regime to abide by a single partisan opinion and to work for the continued presence of the policies and of the regime. But within the framework of the Sudanese system, the regime is founded on a comprehensive organization with different, but not opposed, inclinations. Within this system, there are those who call for change and development without being compelled to leave the regime.

I have been participating in the regime for a year and a half, i.e. since the reconciliation. What was agreed upon in the reconciliation was to give every citizen the opportunity to find a way into the system without any preconditions and to allow this citizen to interact within the system according to what he accepts and views as conducive to achieving the country's interests. as long as he does not deviate from the principle of national unity. Since assuming my office, I have been working and will continue to work to rejuvenate the political and legal system. Here I am today calling for the development of our economic, social and political conditions in the

light of my belief in the values and goals of the Islamic culture and in the light of my experience with the modern political and cultural systems.

As for the relationship with the opponents, the stance of Mr al-Hindi (al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi) toward the reconciliation was a stance of approval in principle. He was in agreement with the other parties to the reconciliation over the general directions of the desired reform but he has preferred to stay away until these directions are achieved. We on our part have preferred to participate positively in realizing these directions. Even though not all the desired reform has been achieved in Sudan--and reform is almost an endless road--what has been actually achieved indicates that reform is an accessible and a needed goal in Sudan. Moreover, the National Front which included all the opposition elements had different political inclinations, even though it was united in its opposition to the regime. The elements that accepted the reconciliation and entered the country were close to the Islamic direction. With their participation in the daily political work, they see the country proceeding in this direction. Seeing this, these elements are not concerned with the issue of power sharing.

No opposition from abroad will be any use, unless it relies on a domestic base. Such a base is not available to the Ba'thists, the communists or the other national opposition factions. I see no meaning in opposition from abroad by any patriotic element because the regime is open to accepting the opposed view and to giving this view the opportunity to gain popular legitimacy and to find its way to implementation if it truly represents the people. The communist and Ba'thist elements are founded on principles that are in conflict with the Sudanese nation's fundamental principles of faith in the Islamic course and in the political system required by such a course-a system founded on freedom and consultation-and in an economic system founded on ethics.

# Camp David

[Question] What is your opinion on the Camp David issue and its consequences and what are the effects of Sudan's official positions?

[Answer] Sudan's initial positions toward the Egyptian-Israeli peace initiatives took a form that confused the observers. This is because Sudan remained committed to the principles of the approved Arab policy regarding the Palestinian issue and, at the same time, approved the first peace initiatives, being confident that Egypt would abide by the Arab and international resolutions. Sudan's position then began to develop with the progress of the negotiations, the retreat of the Egyptian position and the emergence of the final results that disavowed the minimal conditions of the Arab policy vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue. The initial Sudanese positions caused some confusion inside Sudan because the Sudanese public opinion was opposed to the peace inclinations. The reconciled parties adopted a stronger stance of opposition. Those initial positions created an even greater confusion outside Sudan because they were distorted by certain information media which had a purpose behind their depicting Sudan as a supporter of the Camp David accords.

The development of the Sudanese position has ended with Sudan's commitment to the Arab League in its new form and commitment to the league's repeated declarations. Sudan is still firmly committed to the fundamental principles of the Palestinian issue and is ready to cooperate with the Arab countries in whatever serves the Arab cause, whether peacefully or by war.

The Arab position toward Egypt is understandable because Egypt has deviated from the Arab consensus on an issue considered one of the most serious Arab issues. But the rejectionist position has been negative and has not formed any alternative befitting the Arab group that has adopted this position. As for Sudan, it has taken into consideration special bonds that tie it to Egypt and well-known strategic needs and has maintained [its relations] with Egypt, regardless of its opinion of some of Egypt's policies.

# Khartoum University

To be able to form a complete idea about the Muslim Brotherhood, a visit to Khartoum University, whose 40-member union council is controlled by the Muslim Brothers, is a must.

Amin Banna'i, the Students Union foreign affairs secretary, believes that "there are no political motives behind the incidents that have taken place. But the incidents have exposed the opposition's weakness. Had there been an organized opposition, Numayri's regime would have fallen because of the deteriorating economic situation. The crisis that erupted came as a result of the political organization which is not popular and not productive. Its approach is not definite and is ambiguous in thought and in means. In the memorandum we presented to President Numayri in the wake of the incidents, we stressed on amendment of the constitution, on the independence of the judiciary and on the need to define the powers. We are against the state's foreign policy, against Camp David and the peace with Israel and against integration with Egypt. We are also against the negative position of the rejectionist states and their failure to adopt practical steps."

He added: "There is no coordinated opposition. In our opinion, opposition from abroad is futile and dangerous at the same time. We tried it and it almost led to the full internationalization of the Sudanese conflict. One half of the militias were being trained in Ethiopia and Libya and the Soviets could have exploited this fact. There is no possibility for meeting with the communists because there is nothing to bring us together. The minimum that can make us meet with any organization is the Islamic projection. Our relations with the Ba'thists are like our relations with the communists."

On freedom in the university, he said: "These are entrenched gains and there is no backing down on them."

On the Iranian experience, he said: "What has happened in Iran may be repeated in Sudan. There is an Islamic tide."

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SYRIA

'AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT' INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

LD201131 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 17 Nov 79 pp 1, 2 LD

[Interview with Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT correspondent in Tunis--date not given]

[Text] [Question] What are the features of the Syrian working paper which you submitted to the [Arab] foreign ministers at the meeting of the night before last?

[Answer] In preparing our paper we proceeded from the critical stage through which the Arab nation is currently passing as well as from the current developments and what we should do as an Arab nation in the light of such developments. Obviously, at the Baghdad conference we discussed the Camp David accords and what immediate measures should be taken to confront them. At that time we did not lay down a joint Arab strategy or a long-term plan that would, at the political and military levels, enable us to restore balance between us and Israel. Therefore, Camp David was the basic issue dealt with at Baghdad conference whereas it has now become clear to us that we must move to a new stage. Therefore, we have submitted a working paper based on the following principles:

- 1. The manner of strengthening joint action. We have proposed principles that would insure the continuation and consolidation of the basis of Arab action as well as the continuation of implementing the resolutions.
- 2. Taking into consideration the importance of world opinion and the need to expose the enemy by bringing pressure to bear on it and to further isolate the enemy as well as to expose the grav / of the Camp David agreements, we have proposed in the paper a plan for an international move in various fields and on several levels. We have also proposed that international action should be based on our interests and on further isolating Egyptian regime so that nobody will have any dealings with any of the parties to Camp David. We have proposed the following in this regard:

- A. The suspension of dealings with any state that resumes its relations with Israel or any state that recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital or that opens an embassy there.
- B. Banning Arab citizens from dealings with any Egyptian citizen or body that has dealings with the Zionists. On the other hand, we have proposed drafting a new charter for the Arab League inspired from the political programs adopted at the Algiers, Rabat and Baghdad summits.

It is to be noted that the ideas we proposed in the Syrian working paper agree with the proposals submitted by the Iraqi and Jordanian foreign ministers.

[Question] It is obvious that Syria has become the major confrontation state following Egypt's withdrawal. And, consequently, the role it is playing in the Arab-Israeli conflict has become greater. What have you prepared in order to play this role and how do you, on the basis of this role, intend to deal with the Lebanese situation?

[Answer] In fact, I would say first that our relations with the Lebanese and Palestinian brothers are organic and deep-rooted in history. Many of the issues might not be correctly understood or might be understood separately from the reality in which we exist. Our family ties with the Lebanese and Palestinians clearly underline the special considerations that govern the Syrian stand in the Lebanese and Palestinian arenas. I believe that the continuation of the present situation in Lebanon serves only the Zionist enemy. The Camp David scandals only lead to the continuation of this situation which is now giving us a greater opportunity to tackle the fundamental problem, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict. We will say at the Tunis summit and/or outside the summit that the solution of the present situation in Lebanon must be based on the following points:

- 1. The integrity of Lebanon and its sovereignty over all the Lebanese territories with all the results consequent upon this.
- 2. The right of the [Palestinian] resistance to exist in Lebanon and to struggle for the liberation of Palestine. We believe that there is no contradiction between the two principles. It is Israel and the parties to Camp David that are trying to assert such contradiction.

In any case I am optimistic that the summit conference will arrive at a formula for Palestinian-Lebanese relations. I would say in advance that the matter first and foremost concerns our conflict with the enemy. I believe that whatever formula the summit arrives at on this subject, the enemy will continue to interfere in Lebanon and to commit aggression against the (refugee) camps. In my opinion it is a question not of the existence or nonexistence of the resistance in Lebanon but of the determination of the enemy to liquidate the resistance in all circumstances so as to move toward a new stage of implementing the Camp David agreements.

On the other hand, I believe that Lebanon must be supported and that we must accept with samisfaction any Lebanese decision to send the army to the south.

[LD201133] [Question] Do you have any particular plan in mind in order to find a way out of the severe crisis in Lebanon?

[Answer] I believe that Egypt and its allies are now trying more than at any time before to liquidate the PLO as a revolutionary organization and turn it into a political organization that would lose all links with the bases of the revolutionary system. In the Egyptian-Israeli field there are clear imperialist efforts to end the revolutionary character of the resistance. It is true that we should not forget that mistakes have been committed in certain practices but it must also be asserted that these mistakes were not the reason for the repeated Israeli aggressions against the Lebanese territories. The reason is political and aims at creating a new link on the path to accepting the Camp David agreements.

[Question] What is the solution in your opinion?

[Answer] The solution is impossible if we look at the matter from a narrow angle. The solution must be comprehensive. Lebanon will be relieved and so will all the Arab countries when the Arab-Israeli conflict ends. Syria will be relieved too in view of the fact that, because of this conflict, it is having to endure more than many can imagine. Moreover, Syria now is the second country after Israel in terms of the volume of military expenditure. We have no choice in this matter because we are facing any enemy whom we must constantly confront however great the burden may be.

Our conflict with the enemy is a national and historical conflict. Those who say that it can be ended in 2 or 3 months' time are dreaming. The enemy has its objectives and we have our own. The conflict between us will end only when these objectives are achieved, which requires heavy sacrifices on our part.

[Question] Two months ago there were signs of unity between Syria and Iraq which then came to a standstill. Does this mean that the unity project between the two countries has been shelved?

[Answer] The question of unity is basic. Our party incorporates it in its slogans as the first demand. It is not a political stand but an ideological one. We will spare no efforts to active it because it is the central cause of our struggle.

[Question] Are there any new practical steps toward this end?

[Answer] No talks regarding such steps are now taking place.

[Question] As far as we know you have met with the Iraqi foreign minister during your stay in Tunis. Did you discuss unity?

[Answer] My Iraqi colleague and I discussed what we can do at present to contribute to the attainment of the objectives of all the Arabs and to creating a climate that would enable us to regain our usurped rights.

[Question] Do you believe that Arab boycott of Egypt since the Baghdad summit has actually affected it?

[Answer] The Arab boycott has certainly affected the Egyptian regime. The economic situation in Egypt has reached a deplorable state and is worsening every day. The Egyptian citizen is perplexed at seeing that nothing has been achieved as a result of the resounding speeches he hears. The poor have become poorer and the rich have become richer and the opendoor policy has created a new class which is worse than the Pashas class. Political decision-making in Egypt has become part of Zionist occupation, which is the most dangerous kind of occupation. [sentence as published]. We have seen how Egypt has sold oil to Israel on Israeli terms. What proves the deterioration of the economic situation in Egypt is that debts in Al-Sadat's era have increased from \$3 billion to \$15 billion in less than 10 years despite the fact that Egypt exploits the Suez Canal and the oil fields in Sinai.

[Question] Should the oil weapon be used?

[Answer] We Syrians cannot discuss this subject in isolation from our Arab brothers. It must be discussed by the Arab countries as a whole. We used this weapon in 1973 war when the need for its use was ascertained. I believe that all the conditions that would allow its use again must be fulfilled.

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WESTERN SAHARA

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#### JOURNALISTS ACCOMPANY APLS TO WESTERN SAHARA

Paris L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE in French 3-9 Oct 79 (Supplement pp 30-34)

[Article by Francoise Germain-Robin]

[Text] The APLS (Saharan People's Liberation Army) exists. Moroccans know a thing or two about it. Francoise Germain-Robin and Gerard Noel accompanied them on the trails of southern Morocco.

Friday 21 September, somewhere with the APLS. Three landrovers still emblazoned with Moroccan heraldic bearings are spinning along at top speed toward the west. We have just left some sort of a base hidden behind some sparse bushes where we had been taken that same morning by two Saharan fighters named Hamed and Nah, who will be our companions in all our long and complicated journey.

This time we left accompanied by an APLS patrol, two landrovers equipped with heavy machine guns and soldiers who never leave their Kalashnikov. Direction: southern Morocco.

The sun has just set. Pale and immense in an almost white sky. We are still rolling along more than one hour after it had disappeared; all lights out. Night which is growing darker barely slackens our pace. These men evidently know the terrain perfectly. During the night we bivouac in a sandy grove, and twice lights illuminate the horizon. Giving the alarm! An alarm of short duration. However, our friends tell us that they are friendly lights as for a long time now Moroccan vehicles have not left the garrisons, which they still hold, during the night.

It is the following day in the early hours of a chilly morning, the wind has not abated and we are now entering Moroccan territory. Our advance is much more cautious. The landrover which is escorting us climbs every hill very slowly and pauses long enough for a quick inspection with the field glasses, before giving us the signal to follow. As we get closer to our objective the terrain is more uneven and is marked, as it was on the previous day, in all directions by a multitude of wheel tracks. Here the Sahara is far from being a desert...

To be suddenly confronted with what the Moroccans call "Death Valley" is a haunting experience. We go down between enormous boulders into a sort of a canyon embanked on the rocky pitons which surround us. In the dry pebbly river beds, the thorny groves and shrubs there is no sign of life. The silence is total under a heavy and relentless white light. Ideal spot for an ambush.

# Death Valley

In fact it is quite near the site that the stage was set for the scene which occurred on 24 August when the relief column arrived from Azk to rescue the Lebouirate garrison. One month later a stage still stiff and stark in death ever present everywhere. Charred and broken tanks, VVT's, landrovers and missile carriers were left on this flat and naked terrain covered with hundreds of abandoned helmets and shoes. Haversacks and ammunition scattered all around. The position of two tanks, a missile launcher and two landrovers destroyed almost half-way down the hill is evidence of a mad and frantic flight to unattainable safety. Close by in a hollow rock we make a macabre discovery, a Moroccan soldier surprised by death during the retreat and foregotten...Three other charred bodies near their demolished vehicle. This is all that remains between Azk and Lebouirate of this unfortunate royal army which Hassan II does not hesitate to sacrifice unnecessarily for the ideals of another generation.... He has no feeling about these corpses, he makes speeches and holds forth in safety sheltered in his palaces.

About 30 km from the town of Lebouirate the road leading to that city is covered with similar vestiges. All evidence points to a total flight.

Lebouirate, finally, wedged in at the bottom of the valley, its walls still intact, absurdly, roofs collapsed, gaping holes and shutters still flapping and creaking in the motion of the wind. Life stopped here unmistakeably in the early morning of a day which should have been a holiday: the Eid, end of Ramadan.

And yet! This was not a modest garrison without defense. There were 32 positions all around in a 52 km area equipped with tanks and casemates buried in the ground for their protection. A multitude of trenches and look-out stations. A month ago 1,200 soldiers were waiting for death here. The officer in charge had fled before the beginning of the attack. The proof was found in a document in the command post of the garrison. Defeat was judged inevitable by the soldiers and the officers who had been destroyed and demoralized by two previous attacks by the POLISARIO Front, the men refusing to return to their advance post. According to a report sent to Rabat by an officer who had come to conduct an inquiry on 20 August, the soldiers in Lebouirate were only able to "give the alarm and die." This was the fate of 800 of them. The royal army command had remained deaf to the repeated SOS sent by Azelmat, the commanding officer of Lebouirate. To be more exact he had refused to accept the responsibility of sacrificing his men, he had been called to Zak 2 days before the attack and was to be shot. The truth is not very pretty to narrate in the kingdom of Hassan II.

# Agnony, Hell

I heard the convincing truth a little later from the mouths of Lebouirate prisoners and from those who had been in the Zak operation, where more than 600 dead were counted a few days later, on 16 September.

Men of all ages and the ageless, defeated and humiliated in a war which they know is unjust and lost beforehand. Mohamed Dakhi, his face strongly marked and wrinkled, smiles sadly when I was surprised to know his age: 27 years old. "I know...I look like an old man. It is fear, poverty, despair...I have been in Zak for the past 3 years. Attacks, encounters, death never stops. Agony, hell. We are all poor people. Our families, our mothers, our brothers are struggling in poverty. This war is an injustice. It is not in our interest. We cannot win as everyone knows.... For a long time we believed what our leaders said. That the Sahara was our land and the Saharan people did not exist. We were told and we are still told that our enemies are Algerian, Cuban, Vietnamese mercenaries and now they have added the Mauritanians. I believed it too, but it has been finished for a long time. In the southern garrisons we see the Saharans. They pound and badger us. This is an army which is quite sure of itself and is well organized. These are men. Our army is demoralized. It does not want to go to war anymore. There are disturbances in the posts at each attack, the soldiers refuse to go into action. There are suicides, desertions. Our officers are not men. They are the first to run away. However, they think they are very important, we cannot even approach them."

It is not really due to the lack of arms that the Moroccans are meeting with defeat after defeat. From what I could see in a few days, the Moroccan kingdom has become the meeting-place for all the gun hucksters in the world. The captured or destroyed material by the Saharan forces is counted in the hundreds; landrovers, GMC, VVT, tanks, machine-guns, FM and even missile launchers, and aerial batteries, as though it was expected that the Saharans would arrive by air? The trademarks are American, English, German, Spanish, Soviet, but especially, and above all, French. The most recent material, especially the high speed tanks equipped with radar which have intervened for the first time in Zak, were supplied by France. France does not confine itself to selling arms. The French government participates directly in the organization of the war. Many Moroccan soldiers mentioned the presence of Frenchmen who had been their instructors in Fez and Meknes. They gave us their names: Warrant Officers Laborierie and Caresmel, Major Mazy. The documents seized in Lebouirate state that a visit of inspection was carried out by two French officers. On their part the Zak prisoners spoke of three other French officers, captains, who had spent a wek in the garrison in January 1978. They had studied the defense system and had advised them as to how to reinforce it.

# Mirage Unit

The Saharan minister of defense finally confirmed the presence in Smara, an occupied city in the Western Sahara, of a unit of French operational Mirage. As one can see, French neutrality can perform miracles.

For the past 2 months Soviet arms can also be found here: tanks, machine guns, SAM 7 rockets, and it seems some MIG'S. These arms furnished by the new ally of Hassan II, Sadat, and by Iraq.

"This is a new attempt to make Morocco come out of its isolation and accentuate the war against the people in exile, and perhaps expand it" declared B. M. Sayed, deputy secretary general of the POLISARIO Front. "But in spite of all the support it gets, it can be said that, virtually, the Moroccan army does not exist any more. The most operational and strongest regiment has just suffered a defeat in Zak. The army lacks morale. All the sophisticated material which it has at its command is uselss against the unshakable will of our people to recover its territory and its independence."

One can better understand while wandering around for hours when the wind and the light play their score without obstacle, alternating between violence and infinite softness, why these people can be so passionately attached to liberty and independence. Within the nomad tribes which were in existence at the time of colonialism not even half of the population has ever been brought to subjection or even controlled. The past, as well as the present, refutes the facts by which Hassan II attempts to justify his war of occupation, the Moroccan character of its soil, as well as the submission of the tribes to the Moroccan sovereign. A story which we were not able to find in the books but in the memory of the oldsters we met one night under a tent around the traditional Saharan three types of tea. "The first one is as bitter as life, the second soft as love and the third sweet as death" they say... We understood, as we listened to them recount the story of the 40 Saharan tribes united in the past five centuries in a council called "the hand of the 40," who elected their chief and made decisions on war and peace, that it is also in their tradition that these people numbering 600,000 men found the strength in exile to resist these enemies so infinitely superior in numbers and in endurance. Their heroes are not all at the front. They are also in gigantic camps on the Algerian soil where they were allowed to take refuge during their exodus under French bombs. Today, under very precarious conditions, the Saharan people, who had been scattered in the past, are reassembled united around the POLISARIO Front. The social organization, taken over by the women, has one objective for the time being: fight to liberate the country and prepare to return to the native land. If these women are asked how they envisage the future of their people in the regained homeland, they reply "What we wish is to recover our land and our property. Then only the people will decide what it wishes to build with its own power and according to the conditions we will find. All that can be said is that the society it will build will be progressive and revolutionary in the real meaning of the term, because it will be the same people who knew how to become organized in exile and fight.

The Only Dream: Return

An experiment in democratic organization, a considerable effort in training and political and civic education, which doubtlessly will be invaluable tomorrow in the reconstruction of a country ravaged by war. Although

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everyone dreams of going back, no illusion is permitted. It will take place on a soil where everything has been destroyed. The cities liberated by the Saharans have been erased from the face of the earth by the Moroccans. They have been crossed off the maps. Soon with the help of the wind and the sand, there will not be even a trace of them.

Some cities are still occupied by important Moroccan garrisons: El Ayoun the capital, the two provincial capitals, Smara in the north and Dakhla in the south, the mining town of Boucraa where the guerrillas have made the installation unusable, finally Birenzarane, in the center of Rio de Oro, Mabhes, near the Algerian border. A total of 45,000 men of the royal armed forces hold six fortresses where the Saharan soldiers prevent them from coming out. They are holding hundreds of Saharan prisoners, as they are prisoners themselves, who could not or would not flee under heavy bombardment at the opportune time. Trapped, they symbolized Moroccan occupation to which all the newspapermen (ourselves included), who were able to penetrate and circulate in the APLS, can testify that it is nothing more than a hopeless murderous boast.

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